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Aristotle's "Second Man" Argument 
THEODORE SCALTSAS 
"We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or 
different" (Metaphysics Z, 6, 1031al5-16). This is the goal Aristotle sets 
himself in what is probably the most profound, and no less perplexing, 
chapter of Book Z of his Metaphysics, which is dedicated to the exam- 
ination of substance. In Chapter Z, 6, Aristotle offers his final response to 
the Platonic ontology, arguing that each thing is a nature; for Plato, far from 
being a nature, a thing does not even have a nature. Aristotle initially 
developed the categorial system in which objects have natures; but in 
Metaphysics Z, 6 he put forward an argument showing that any distinction 
between a subject and its essence or nature will lead to metaphysical 
predicament. His argument in Z, 6 is a reductio ad absurdum of the claim 
that a thing's essence is different from that thing. It is a regress argument 
which, despite its centrality, has not attracted anywhere near the attention 
that the Third Man Argument commands in the literature, probably be- 
cause it seems to be a straightforward derivation of an infinite series that 
proliferates the essences of substances. I believe that the argument is more 
complex than the brevity of Aristotle's presentation suggests, and I will 
argue that the regress is not a benign proliferation of the ontology, but is in 
fact a vicious regress stemming from logically incompatible premises.' 
Aristotle's result is not peculiar to his theory, but is a metaphysical claim 
' Among commentators that have located the problem in the infinite number of the 
generated essences are Alexander of Aphrodisias In Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. M. 
Hayduck (Berlin, Germany: George Reimer, 1891) 484.34-485.30; Asclepius, In Meta- 
physicorum, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, Germany: George Reimer, 1888) 394.35-395.1, 
395.30-31; Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, transl. J.P. Rowan 
(Chicago, Ill.: Library of Living Catholic Thought, Henry Regnery Co., 1961) 1376; 
W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1924) v. 11, 
p. 176; M. Burnyeat and others, Notes on Z (Oxford, England: Sub-faculty of Philoso- 
phy, Oxford University, 1979) p. 42; M. Frede and G. Patzig, Aristoteles 'Metaphysik Z', 
(Munich, Germany: Verlag, 1988) vol. 2, p. 102; T.H. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles 
(Oxford.England: Clarendon Press, 1988) p. 219; E. Halper, One and Many in Aristot- 
Phronesis 1993. Vol. XXXV11112 (Accepted February 1993) 
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that commands respect in any metaphysical system,2 warning against any 
sort of ontological gap between a substance and its nature.3 
The Nature-Feature Problem. 
One of the problems that Plato attempted to resolve by the introduction of 
the Theory of Forms is Zeno's paradox. Namely, to explain how like things 
can be unlike, and more generally, how opposites can belong to opposites.4 
Plato's solution was a qualified acceptance of the copresence of opposites. 
By that I mean that his metaphysics makes it possible for opposites to be 
copresent in the same subject in the physical world, but impossible for 
opposites to belong to one another in the world of Forms. Thus, Socrates 
can be like and unlike,5 or large and small,6 by partaking of opposite Forms 
le's Metaphysics (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1989) p. 82; M.J. Loux, 
Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1991) p. 101. 
2 I am thus in full agreement with M. Loux's conclusion that "the claim that a primary 
ousia and the fundamental essence in virtue of which it is what it is are necessarily one and 
the same is theory-neutral. It expresses a constraint on any attempt to pick out the 
ontologically basic things. Commitment to the Identity Thesis, the Aristotle of Z.6 wants 
to claim, is a presupposition of doing anything that can genuinely be called metaphysics" 
(op. cit., p. 94). 
3According to some commentators, Aristotle is not claiming here that particular sub- 
stance is identical with its essence, but that a universal species form is identical with its 
essence. Thus, Asclepius, op. cit., 392.1-2, 393.23-24, 397.2; M. Furth, Substance, Form 
and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics (Cambridge,England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988) p. 236; E. Halper, op. cit., p. 88; M. Loux, op. cit., p. 103. According to 
others, Aristotle is claiming the identity of particular substance (whether individual form 
or the composite) with its essence. Thus, Alexander, op. cit., 483.18-20; Aquinas, op. cit. 
1357; W. Ross, op. cit., p. 176; M. Woods, "Substance and Essence in Aristotle", 
Aristotelian Society Proceedings 75 (1974-75) pp. 177-179; E. Hartman, "Aristotle on the 
Identity of Substance and Essence," Philosophical Review LXXXV (1976) p. 545, and 
Substance, Body, and Soul (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1977) pp. 58- 
59,62-63, 73; Frede and Patzig, op. cit. p. 87; T. Irwin, op. cil., p. 218. Finally, according 
to J. Lear, Aristotle: the desire to understand (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 1988), Aristotle is claiming that the species form is primary substance 
(p. 280), where the species form is neither particular nor universal (pp. 285-86). 
4 "If things are many, then it follows that the same things must be both like and unlike; 
but that is impossible; for unlike things cannot be like or like things unlike" (Parmenides 
127e 1-4). 
S "But I find nothing strange, Zeno, if he shows that things which get a share of both [the 
like and the unlike] undergo both qualifications, nor if he shows that all things are one by 
reason of having a share in the one, and that those very same things are also in turn many 
by reason of having a share of multitude" (Parmenides 129b3-6). 
"both things are in Simmias, largeness and smallness" (Phaedo 102b5-6). 
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which come to be present in him. But none of the opposite Forms can be its 
opposite.7 E.g., the One cannot be many, nor the Like unlike. In this way, 
Zeno's restrictions are shifted to the level of the forms away from the level 
of physical things. 
A metaphysical result that follows from Plato's different treatment of the 
copresence of opposites in the world of Forms and the world of things is that 
participation in the Forms cannot bestow onto things the nature of the 
Forms. That is, participation in the Form of the Like cannot bestow to the 
participant the nature of the Like, for then the participant could not accept 
the opposite of the Like, and be both like and unlike (any more than the 
Form of the Like can be unlike). Whatever it is that the thing acquires by 
participation in the Form of the Like, it cannot be what prohibits the Like 
from being unlike, since the thing can be both like and unlike. This would 
have been a happy ending, if it were not for the fact that Plato needed within 
the world of things the very restriction on the copresence of opposites that 
he allocated exclusively to the Forms. To see this, we need to look at the 
example of the fire in the Phaedo. 
Plato's treatment of the relation of the hot and the cold to fire in the 
Phaedo is problematic. On the one hand, he wants to be able to explain why 
the Cold cannot be in a fire, which is hot. On the other hand, he wants to be 
able to allow that both the large and the small can be in Socrates. Ultimate- 
ly, he does not manage to explain both phenomena. This is not coincidental, 
but reflects a fundamental shortcoming of the Theory of Forms; namely, 
that only Forms, not things, are natures. 
Plato has only one mechanism in his metaphysics for prohibiting the 
copresence of opposites: an opposite cannot characterize its opposite. It is 
only when the opposite is the subject that the restriction is operative. Thus 
the Large cannot be small. On the contrary, Plato's mechanism for allowing 
for the copresence of opposites is to attach both of them to a subject. Thus, 
Socrates can be both large and small. Both opposites can be copresent in 
Socrates because neither of them is said of the other opposite; although 
"both things are in Simmias, largeness and smallness" (Phaedo 102b5-6), 
"not only is largeness itself never willing to be large and small at the same 
time, but also . . . the largeness in us never admits the small" (102d6-8).' 
7 "But if he shows that what it is to be one is many, and the many in turn one, that will 
surprise me. The same is true in like manner of all other things. If someone should show 
that the kinds of characters in themselves undergo these opposite qualifications, there is 
reason for surprise." (Parmenides 1 29b6-c3) 
8 Also, "the small that's in us is not willing ever to come to be, or to be, large. Nor will any 
other of the opposites, while still being what it was, at the same time come to be, and be, 
its own opposite" (102e6-103al). See also Parmenides 129b6-c3 (note 7 above). 
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The tension between these two mechanisms surfaces in the case of fire. 
Fire can be hot only, not cold as well, unlike Socrates who can be both large 
and small. But why is that? What prohibits the Cold from being in a fire, 
copresent with the Hot, just like the Large and the Small are copresent in 
Socrates? Plato introduces the subtler reasons to explain this. He says that 
"not only do the forms that are opposites [e.g. Hot-Cold] not abide each 
other's attack; but there are, in addition, certain other things that don't 
abide the opposites' attack" (Phaedo 104c7-9); these are "things that are 
compelled by whatever occupies them [e.g. fire] to have not only its own 
form, but always the form of some opposite [Hot] as well" (104d1-3).9 Yet, 
this is far from sufficient to explain why a fire cannot accept the Cold. The 
only thing that the subtler reasons establish is a necessary connection 
between being a fire and being hot. Thus, we can always expect a fire to be 
hot. But this says nothing about the fire's being cold or not. Suppose one 
said that necessarily, every complex organism is large - being larger than its 
parts; e.g. Socrates will always be large, since he is a complex organism 
composed of smaller parts. But this is entirely compatible with his also 
being small. So, although "being an organism" always brings with it being 
large, the organism can also accept the Small. It follows that the fact that 
fire is always hot does not provide a reason why it cannot also be cold. Thus 
Plato's subtler reasons fail to explain why a fire cannot be cold, why it 
cannot "abide the opposites' attack" (Phaedo 104c8-9). 
We saw that Plato's only metaphysical mechanism for prohibiting the 
copresence of opposites is making one of the opposites the subject. None of 
the opposites will accept its opposite and come to be its opposite. "' The only 
way to prohibit a fire from being cold isfor the Hot in thefire to be the subject 
in the fire. If the Hot in the fire is itself the subject in the fire, rather than 
being attached to the subject, then the Cold could never be present in a fire, 
since opposites do not characterize opposites. To achieve this in Plato's 
metaphysics, participation in the Hot should not just bring the Hot in the 
participant; rather, it should make the Hot in the participant the subject in 
the participant. Therefore, participation should not introduce a feature in a 
participating subject, but rather determine the very nature of the subject. If 
participation in the Hot achieved this, then the Cold could not come to be 
present in the participating thing, since then the Cold would be character- 
izing its opposite, the Hot, which the Theory prohibits. 
4 "It is not only the opposite [the Hot] that doesn't admit its opposite [the Cold]; there is 
also that [fire] which brings up an opposite [the Hot] into whatever [body] it enters itself; 
and that thing [fire], the very thing that brings it [the Hot] up, never admits the quality 
[the Cold] opposed to the one that's brought up [the Hot].- (Phaedo 105a2-5) 
"' Phaedo 102d6-8, 102e6-103a1, Parmenides 129b6-c3. 
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But a problem would then ensue. If participation in an opposite Form 
determined the nature of the participating subject, then Socrates' participa- 
tion in the Large would make it impossible for him to also participate in the 
Small, since then the Small would characterize the Large in Socrates, which 
Plato explicitly prohibits (Phaedo 102d6-8). It follows that Plato cannot 
allow for participation to determine the nature of the subject (since he 
wants to allow opposites to be copresent in the subject), and thus cannot 
explain why a fire cannot be cold. 
By the Timaeus, Plato has firmly made up his mind not to allow a thing's 
participation in a Form to determine its nature. 
the same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies - that 
must be always called the same, for, inasmuch as she always receives all things, she 
never departs at all from her own nature and never, in any way or at any time, 
assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; it is the natural 
recipient of all impressions,. and appears different from time to time by reason 
of them. But the forms which enter into and go out of it are the likenesses of realities 
modeled after their patterns . . . (50b5-c5, my emphasis). 
Plato can thereby allow things in the world to possess opposites without 
facing Zenonian paradoxes, since none of these opposites characterize each 
other as subject; rather, both opposites characterize the participating sub- 
ject whose nature remains unaltered by participation in the Forms. 
Plato came face to face with the nature-feature problem by an un- 
orthodox route: through the difficulties presented by Zeno's paradox and 
the resolution he gave to it - by allowing two opposites to belong to a 
subject, but not to each other as subject. The nature-feature problem 
surfaced as the question of whether participation in a Form determines the 
nature of the participating subject or simply attaches features to it, leaving 
its nature unaffected. In the case of things in the world, the nature of the 
participating subject is impervious to the Forms that are attached to it by 
participation, for reasons relating to the resolution of Zeno's paradox. In 
itself, the subject remains different from any feature that belongs to it by 
participation. 
Aristotle's first attempt towards a resolution 
That participation leaves the nature of the participating subject unaltered 
entails that a subject which participates in a substantial Form, e.g. the Form 
of Human Being, comes to possess the character of Human Being while 
retaining its a-human nature - "never departing at all from its own nature" 
(50c1-2). Thus paradoxically, in itself, the subject in a human being is not a 
human being. 
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In order to introduce the possibility of an ontological distinction between 
the nature of a subject and its features, Aristotle differentiates between two 
ways of belonging to a subject in the Categories: 
Of things there are: some are said of a subject . .. For example, man is said of a 
subject, the individual man . . . Some are in a subject . . . (By "in a subject" I mean 
what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) 
For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul 
(Ia20-26) 
All the other things [apart from primary substances] are either said of the primary 
substances as subjects or in them as subjects. . For example. animal is predicated 
of man and therefore of individual man;. . . Again, colour is in body and therefore 
also in an individual body; . . . Thus all the other things are either said of the 
primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.... For example. animal is 
predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; . . . Again, colour is in 
body and therefore also in an individual body; . . . Thus all the other things are 
either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.(2a34-2b5) 
Secondary substances are said of a subject while non-substantial character- 
istics are in a subject. Non-substantial characteristics belong to a subject in 
a different way than secondary substances do, and do not determine the 
nature of the subject they belong to. Secondary substances on the other 
hand do determine the natures of subjects, i.e. what the primary substances 
are (Categories, 2b29-33). In particular, the relation of "being said of a 
subject" secures that the name and the definition of what is said of the 
subject, e.g. "human being", are predicated of the subject (Categories 
2a20-24). 
But even this distinction between two ways of belonging to a subject still 
retains one fundamental Platonic position, namely, the subject-nature 
distinction. In the Aristotle of the Categories the distinction is between the 
primary substance and the secondary substance said of it. The primary 
substance, Socrates, is the subject, and the secondary substance, being a 
human being, is its nature, which is "said of the subject". 
Although Aristotle's categorial scheme allows for a distinction between 
belonging as a nature and belonging as a feature, it nevertheless still retains 
the division between the subject and its nature. Hence, as in Plato's meta- 
physics, in itself, the subject is other than what its nature stands for. If there 
is a difference between Socrates and the form of human being, no matter 
how intimately Socrates might be related to it, he is not it. The very 
existence of a relation between Socrates and "being a human being", even 
if it is the relation of "being said of a subject", divorces Socrates from it. 
A similar situation is generated if the ultimate subject in a substance is 
Aristotelian matter. The position that Aristotle entertains in Metaphysics 
Z, 3, namely that the matter is the ultimate subject in a substance, would 
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produce the same problems in the Aristotelian corpus as the Timaean 
receptacle generates for Plato. Whether the substratum is the Platonic 
formless receptacle, or characterless prime matter, the problem remains 
the same: if the subject is other than the forms that belong to it, then the 
subject itself will not be in its nature what the forms stand for. The subject 
may be related to the forms, in one way or another, but in itself, as it stands 
on the one side of this relation, it will not be what they are. Thus, if the 
subject in a substance is different from the nature of the substance, however 
it may be related to that nature, the subject itself will not be what the nature 
stands for; e.g. that to which the form "human being" belongs as subject 
will not, itself, be a human being. 
The Resolution 
The resolution of the nature-feature problem requires the distinction be- 
tween two kinds of characteristics: natures and features; but it ultimately 
rests on the role these characteristics play in a thing. The Aristotle of the 
Categories departed from Plato by introducing a distinction between the 
nature of a thing and its features. But he still followed Plato in "relating" 
both the nature, and the features, to the thing (by two different ways of 
belonging to it). It is the Aristotle of the central books of the Metaphysics 
that realizes that a further departure from Plato is needed; namely, to 
abandon the relation between a subject and its nature by giving the nature 
the role of the substantial subject itself. He says in Metaphysics Z, 6 that 
each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to 
be the substance of each thing (1031a17-18). 
Before coming to the detailed examination of the arguments that estab- 
lish this result in Z, 6, we should briefly turn to the question of the relation 
of the present problem to that in the Third Man Argument (TMA). G.E.L. 
Owen, in his paper "The Platonism of Aristotle", and M. Woods, in 
"Substance and Essence in Aristotle", thought that Aristotle reached his 
Metaphysics Z position as a way of avoiding the TMA by rejecting the 
Non-Identity Assumption.) I hope the discussion above has shed enough 
light on the nature-feature problem, to enable us to see that it is a different 
problem from the one addressed by the Non-Identity Assumption. We see 
this more clearly when we realize that the nature-feature problem can be 
resolved without giving up the Non-Identity Assumption. Furthermore, it 
" G.E.L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristotle", British Academy Lecture (1965), re- 
printed in Articles on Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (London, 
England: Duckworth, 1975) vol. 1, pp. 21-25. Woods, op. cit., pp. 177-179. 
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was within Plato's power to resolve it, but he chose (for reasons we re- 
viewed above) to go a different way. Specifically, when in the Timaeus 
Plato opted out for the position that participation in a Form does not change 
the nature of the partaking subject (see quoted passage above, 50b5-5), he 
could have gone the opposite way and allowed that, in some cases (namely, 
in the cases of substantial Forms) participation in a Form determines the 
nature of the subject. That is, the universal nature which receives all bodies 
would depart from her own nature and assume a form like that of the things 
which enter into her. Thus, participation in the Form of Human Being 
would turn the very nature of the participating subject into that of a human 
being. Had Plato made that choice, instead of the opposite one which he in 
fact made, then a participating subject would change in its very constitution 
and become, itself, the nature that was introduced by participation in a 
(substantial) Form. 
What is of interest to us in this case is that this would resolve the 
nature-feature problem, because the participating subject would relinquish 
its own nature to the one introduced by participation in the (substantial) 
Form, so that it would itself become that nature. But this identification of 
the subject to the nature introduced by participation in the Form need not 
be incompatible with the Non-Identity Assumption. Plato could allow that 
the Immanent (substantial) Form become the subject in the thing as a result 
of participation, while still retaining the difference between the Form and 
its instantiations (Immanent Forms). Giving up the Non-Identity Assump- 
tion would require a further step; namely, not only should there be no 
metaphysical gap between the subject and the nature of a thing, but there 
should be no metaphysical gap between a Form and its instantiations, i.e. 
between the universal nature and the nature of a thing. Even if the subject 
in a thing becomes identical to the Immanent Form as a result of participa- 
tion, the Immanent Form can still be different from the Form - hence, 
Non-Identity. But Non-Identity, along with Self-Predication, would gener- 
ate the Third Man regress. So, the identification of the subject with its 
nature need not be the identification of the subject with the Form, and 
hence, need not be the rejection of the Non-Identity Assumption of the 
Third Man, which is what G.E.L. Owen and M. Woods have taken it to be. 
Having resolved the nature-feature problem by the subject-nature identifi- 
cation, one would still be free to tell a further story about the relation of the 
substance to the universal form. Z, 6's target is the identification of a thing 
with its own nature, not with the universal forms. As we shall see, this is 
required for a substance to be a xaO' wi6o (kath' hauto) entity, namely an 
entity that is what it is in virtue of itself, rather than in virtue of something 
different from it, and related to it. 
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A final note. Understanding Aristotle's Z, 6 claim that each entity is 
identical to its nature gives rise to difficulties, regardless of how the claim is 
interpreted. One way to understand it is to assume that Aristotle is identify- 
ing the universal species form of a substance (e.g "human being") with its 
nature or essence. This reading makes the identification unproblematic, 
since it is a definable form that is identified with its essence. But it fails to 
pay justice to the Aristotelian position that a substance is what it is in virtue 
of itself, since it retains the ontological difference between Socrates and his 
essence. Another way of interpreting the Aristotelian identity claim is that 
the individual substantial form of a substance is identical to the substance's 
essence, and that in turn to the substance itself. But this position faces the 
following problems; first, that the individual essence is different from the 
universal essence; second, that the individual essence is not definable, 
while essence, according to Aristotle, is; and third, that the substance (e.g. 
Socrates) is the individual form, and not the composite of matter and form 
which includes his flesh and bones. Finally, one can interpret Aristotle in Z, 
6, as identifying the composite substance, e.g. Socrates, with its essence, so 
that no ontological relation is required to bond substance to essence. This 
avoids the last problem, since the substance here is the composite of matter 
and form. It further explains why the substance is what it is in virtue of itself. 
But it reinstates the problem of the relation between the substance and the 
universal essence (species form), a successful resolution of which will have 
to accommodate the Aristotelian positions of the definability of essence, 
and the non-materiality of essence. 
I will not address these issues here, but only say that I have argued for the 
third option.12 Each of these options faces difficulties with Aristotle's 
epistemological or metaphysical commitments. Each proposed solution 
involves emphasizing one or other of Aristotle's commitments as more 
central than the rest, and producing acceptable readings of the remaining 
2 1 have argued for the third option in Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Meta- 
physics (Cornell University Press, forthcoming) ch. 6. Variants of the above positions 
with criticism of the alternatives have been put forward in the commentaries mentioned 
in note 3 above. Further discussion can be found in G. E. L Owen, op. cit.. pp. 21-25, and 
"Particular and General", Aristotelian Society Proceedings 79 (1978-79) pp. 3, 12-16; S. 
Marc Cohen, "Individual and Essence in Aristotle's Metaphysics," Paideia: Special 
Aristotle Issue (1978) pp. 82-84; A. Code, "On the Origins of some Aristotelian Theses 
about Predication", in How Things Are, ed. J. Bogen and J. E. McGuire (Boston, Mass.: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985) pp. 119-123; J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in 
the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
1957) pp. 220-222; and J. Whiting, "Form and Individuation in Aristotle", History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1986) pp. 369-73. A very useful review of the alternative 
positions is given in Loux. op. cit., pp. 94-108. 
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ones, even if slightly strained. In what follows I assume the minimum of 
what is required for the resolution of the nature-feature problem, namely 
that Aristotle is identifying a substance with its essence, and leave it open 
whether the substance is taken to be the individual form or the composite. 
The Regress 
Aristotle argues for the identity of a substance and its essence in Meta- 
physics Z, 6 through an infinite regress argument, as well as five further 
arguments. We shall refer to the regress as the "Second Man" Argument 
(SMA), because it posits a second substance, given a first, namely the 
essence of the first substance (unlike the "Third Man" Argument, which 
posits a third substance, given two similar substances). Aristotle gives the 
regress argument in the following: 
The absurdity lof the separation of a substance from its essence] would appear also 
if one were to assign a name to each of the essences; for there would be another 
essence, besides the original one, e.g. to the essence of horse there will belong a 
second essence. (1031b28-30) 
... if they [i.e. the essence of one and the one] were different, the process would go 
on to infinity; for we should have the essence of one, and the one, so that in their 
case also the same argument would be found. Clearly, then, each primary and 
self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence. (1032a2-6, my emphasis) 
In the case of the essence of horse, an infinite regress is not mentioned, but 
is alluded to in "the same argument would be found". A regress is generat- 
ed, driven by the principle that an essence has an essence, to which the 
premises are committed. Notes on Zeta takes Aristotle's argument about 
the horse (1031b28-30) to be different from the infinite regress, reaching 
the conclusion that the essence of horse will have an essence of its own. 
They say: "In (1) [1031b28-301 the absurdity was that horse generates an 
essence of its essence, here that it generates an infinite chain of essences"'. 
I do not see why Notes on Zeta think there is something absurd about the 
claim that an essence has an essence; especially since Aristotle is explicitly 
assuming in the argument of the essence of a horse that essence is substance 
(103 1b31-32). Further, on the very principle on which the essence of a horse 
will have an essence, the latter essence will have an essence, too, and so on 
to infinity. So why does Notes on Zeta not find a regress in the example of 
the essence of horse? Aquinas, also, does not see this argument (regarding 
the essence of horse) as an infinite regress argument, although his recon- 
' Burnyeat. op. cit., p. 42. 
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struction of it is not complete.'4 Code thinks that a regress can be derived, 
but that nevertheless Aristotle is not making that point here. Rather, he 
takes Aristotle to be pointing to an absurdity that is generated by the claim 
that the essence of horse is different from the essence of the essence of horse 
(op. cit., p. 121). Yet, Code does not offer a satisfactory justification of the 
absurdity claim.'5 Alexander takes the argument to lead to an infinite 
14 Aquinas says: "a horse is something having the essence of a horse. Now, if this differs 
from a horse, this will have a different name, and let us call it A. Therefore, since A is a 
thing, it will have an essence different from itself, just as horse does. Thus this thing 
which constitutes the being of a horse will have a different essence. But this is clearly 
false. Now this argument proceeds in the same way with regard to the quiddity as the first 
argument did with regard to the Ideas" (op. cit., 1374). It is very difficult to understand 
why Aquinas claims that the thing which is the being of a horse cannot have a different 
essence. He certainly does not allude to an infinite regress as the problem. His reference 
to the "first argument with regard to the Ideas" is not very helpful either. The reason is 
that Aristotle's first argument (Metaphysics, 1031a28-1031b3) concludes, according to 
Aquinas, that the Platonists will have to admit substances which "will constitute the 
essence of these Ideas and will be prior to them" (op. cit., 1362). But, even if this were 
problematic for the Platonists, it is not evident yet that it would be for Aristotle who does 
allow (before coming to the subject matter of Z, 6) that the essence of a substance is prior 
to the substance (Metaphysics, 1029a29-32). Further, we cannot be illuminated by the 
subsequent arguments (starting at Metaphysics, 1031b3) about the Ideas as to what 
Aquinas takes the falsehood to be. The reason is that Aquinas attributes to Aristotle a 
distinction between the claim that the substance is different from its essence, and the 
claim that the substance is separate from its essence (1363). The subsequent arguments 
about Ideas are premised, according to Aquinas, by the stronger claim of the separation 
of a substance from its essence. But the argument about the essence of horse (Meta- 
physics, 1031b28-30) only assumes, according to Aquinas, the difference between the 
substance and its essence. 
So it is difficult to unravel Aquinas' reasons for claiming that the thing which is the 
being of horse cannot be different from its essence. Especially since they must be reasons 
which are transferable back to the initial substance and its essence, since the conclusion 
is, not that an essence is the same as its essence, but that each thing is the same as its 
essence. Hence, the reasons for the identity cannot be peculiar to an essence, but must 
apply to any substance. 
, Code supplies an argument for Aristotle, to show that the essence of horse is identical 
to the essence of the essence of horse (ibid., p. 122). He argues that the definition of the 
essence of horse will be the same as the definition of the essence of the essence of horse. 
From this, plus the claim that the essence of something is just what is signified by the 
definition of the essence, he concludes that essences that share the same definition are 
one and the same entity. But this assumes that for essences, qualitative identity entails 
numerical identity. Frank Lewis agrees with Code and uses this principle in his analysis of 
the same passage in Z, 6, in "Plato's Third Man Argument and the 'Platonism' of 
Aristotle", in How Things Are, op. cit., p. 161. He formalizes (and strengthens) the 
claim: "x is the definition of y, only if y = x". Both commentators base their claim on 
passages in Topics A. 7 (Code, p. 113, Lewis, p. 174), where Aristotle says that if two 
things are not the same they cannot have the same definition (102al3-14). They under- 
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regress. 16 So do Frede and Patzig, who include the term LCt;tw (of horse), 
which was excised from the text by Bonitz and all subsequent commenta- 
tors. The resulting regress, then, is a regress of essences of horse: "Denn 
dan wurde es noch zusatzlich zu jedem "Was es heisst, dies zu sein" ein 
weiteres geben, etwa fur das "Was es heisst, ein Pferd zu sein" ein weiteres 
"Was es heisst, ein Pferd zu sein"" (1031b29-30). From this they conclude 
that "das Unsinnige der Konstruktion einer aufsteigenden Reihe von "Was 
es heisst, dies zu sein" liegt fur Aristoteles gerade darin, dass es sich um 
einen unendlichen Regress handelt, der ausserdem nicht von der Stelle 
kommt."'7 But again, no absurdity has been demonstrated. Proliferation is 
unwelcome, but in itself it is not absurd. Irwin does not take the sequence of 
essences to be a sequence of infinitely many of the same entity - i.e. that 
each essence of essence . . . of horse collapses to the essence of horse. But 
he does locate the absurdity in the infinity of the series;"X so does Alexan- 
der, also.'9 
stand sameness in terms of numerical oneness, because Aristotle says that the term "the 
same" is used "in a sense agreed on by everyone when applied to what is numerically 
one" (103a23-24). But this evidence is not sufficient to support the claim that sameness of 
definition entails numerical identity. They seem to ignore Aristotle's statements in the 
Metaphysics, to the effect that "some things are one in number, others in species . . . in 
number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is one . . . things 
that are one in species are not all one in number" (1016b31-36). Furthermore, there is a 
long tradition of commentators who attribute the opposite view to Aristotle, in the 
doctrine of individual forms. (For an exhaustive survey of the contemporary discussion, 
see T. Irwin, op. cit., pp. 569-70.) Most recently, M. Frede argues that Aristotle is 
committed to individual forms, and says about them: "But if it should be demanded that 
there be something about the form in and by itself which distinguishes it from other forms 
of the same kind, the answer is that there is no such distinguishing mark, and that there is 
no need for one", in "Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics", in Aristotle on Nature and 
Living Things, ed. A. Gotthelf (Pittsburgh, Penn., Mathesis Publications, Inc., 1985) 
pp. 23-24. Hence (and more generally), the grounds on which commentators attribute 
individual substantial forms to Aristotle are grounds for denying that Aristotle believed 
that sameness of definition entails numerical oneness; but this is the assumption made by 
Code and Lewis for the justification of the absurdity claim in their reading of Z, 6. 
lb Alexander, op. cit., 484.35-37. 
" Frede and Patzig, op. cit., p. 102. 
' Irwin, op. cit., p. 219. 
'9 In fact, Alexander believes that one might try to avoid the absurdity by avoiding the 
infinity, by assuming that the series will not extend to infinity but will end at some point in 
an entity which is not different from its essence. And he thinks that Aristotle had this 
objection in mind when he counter-objected (according to Alexander): "why should not 
some things be essences from the start, since essence is substance?" (op. cil., 1031b31- 
32). The rationale attributed to Aristotle by Alexander here is that, if some entity along 
the line will be the same with its essence, it might as well be the first one - thus dispensing 
with the series of essences altogether (485.6-16). This shows that, according to Alexan- 
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It makes no difference whether the substances in question are Platonic 
Forms, e.g. of the One or of Horse, or physical substances, e.g. a horse or a 
human being. All that matters is that the initial entity be a substance. 
Within the context of Z, 6, to be a substance is to be a primary and kath' 
hauto entity.20 These are the entities which are said to be what they are, and 
are what they are, in virtue of themselves; they are "substances which have 
no other substances nor entities prior to them" (1031a28-30); and are 
"things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and 
primary" (1031b13-14). In the case of substances, says Aristotle, if the 
substance is other than its essence, an infinite regress will follow. 
Our first concern here will be to establish the premises from which the 
regress follows. We just saw that the argument concerns substances, name- 
ly, things which are what they are in virtue of themselves. For example, a 
tree is a tree in virtue of itself, but a green thing is not green in virtue of 
itself, but in virtue of, e.g., its being a tree. It is green because it is a tree and 
trees are green. But it is not a tree because it is some further thing, which in 
its turn is a tree. There is no further cause to which one can appeal to explain 
why a tree is a tree, other than the tree's being what it is; it has "no other 
substances nor entities prior to [it]" (1031a29-30), and does not "depend on 
something else, but . . . [is] self-subsistent and primary" (1031b13-14). So, 
an initial assumption of the argument is that there are substances, namely, f 
things which are f in virtue of themselves (Existential Premise). 
Two further assumptions are that a substance has an essence (Essentialist 
Premise), and (the premise under contention in the argument) that ess- 
ences are different from their substances (Non-Identity). Thus, in the case 
of a horse, its nature of being a horse is different from the horse.2" 
The Non-Identity claim is expressed in three different instances through- 
out Z, 6. Once as a subject of inquiry, and twice as an assumption in the 
arguments, the last being the Second Man Argument. Aristotle expresses it 
in terms of difference: "We must inquire whether a thing and its essence are 
the same or different VETEVI? " (1031a15-16); "if the essence of good is to 
be different [E"TEoVJ from the Idea of good, . . ." (1031a31-32,); "if they 
[the One and its essence] were different [akko]. . ." (1032a2-3, my emphas- 
der, what is objectionable is the infinity of the generated essences. He thinks that the 
difficulty is avoided if the series is made finite, and the series can then be dispensed with 
on grounds of ontological parsimony. But we shall see that the difficulty persists even if 
there are only finitely many essences in a substance. 
21 Metaphysics, 1031a28, 1031bl3-14, 1032a5. 
2' This Non-Identity Assumption, as we already saw, concerns the relation of the 
substance to its essence, leaving open the relation of the essence to the universal form. 
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es). We need to assume, therefore, that a substance is a different entity 
from its essence. 
Finally, there is one more assumption that Aristotle is operating on 
throughout the chapter; it is that the essence of a thing is itself substance. 
This premise appears three times in the text. First, in the introduction, 
where he says that "the essence is said to be the substance of each thing" 
(1031al8). But more directly, in the context of the regress he says "since 
essence is substance" (1031b31-32). Finally, we can understand the sense in 
which essence is substance from the third occurrence of this claim in the 
chapter. Here Aristotle introduces the hypothesis that "essence is sub- 
stance" (1031b2-3), having just described substances as kath' hauto entities 
with "no other substances nor entities prior to them" (1031a29-20), but 
being what they are in virtue of themselves. This is the sense in which 
essences are substances; they do not need to be physically separate, in the 
way that concrete substances are; rather, they have to satisfy the sub- 
stancehood criterion of being kath' hauto entities, being what they are in 
virtue of themselves. 
The assumption that essence is substance is vital, because without it 
Aristotle could not derive the regress. The derivation of the regress re- 
quires that an essence be the type of entity that has an essence: "to the 
essence of horse there will belong a second essence" (1031b30). But it is 
substances, namely primary entities with a nature (which are what they are 
in virtue of themselves rather than being a complex of one thing said of 
another thing), that paradigmatically have essences (1030a6-13, 1030a29- 
30, b5-6). So the assumption that essence is substance secures that essences 
are the kind of entity that have essence, which generates the regress.22 
We can now state the premises of the Second Man Argument and derive 
the regress. (The expression "what it is to be anf' designates the essence of 
a substance which is an f in virtue of itself.) The operative definition of 
substance is: 
22 Here I disagree with M. Loux who says that in Z, 6, Aristotle is not committed to the 
premiss that "essence is ousia" because "that is precisely what Z, 6 is meant to establish" 
(op. cit., p. 99). But Aristotle must be committed to that premise, in the sense of "ousia" 
just explained, if the regress is to be generated. Being committed to the premise that 
essence is substance does not entail that the essence of a substance is identical to the 
substance. All the premise claims is that an essence is the type of entity that has a nature 
of its own, and is in that sense a substance; this leaves it open whether it is identical to the 
substance it belongs to or not. It is the latter question that is the target of Z. 6, not the 
former, as Loux assumes. 
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Definition: A substance is an entity that is an f in virtue of itself. 
The "Second Man" Argument: 
Existential Premise: There are substances. 
Essentialist Premise: If an f is a substance, there is anfi = what it is to be 
an f. 
Non-Identity: The f is different from the f,. 
Essence Substantiality: The f, is a substance. 
On the basis of these premises we can now derive the regress. By the 
Existential premise, there are substances. By the Essentialist Premise, 
given an f, which is a substance, there is an fi = what it is to be an f. By 
Non-Identity, thefi is different from thef. By Essence Substantiality, thef, 
is a substance. Hence, by the Essentialist Premise, there will be an'2 = what 
it is to be anf,. By Non-Identity, the f2 $ the fl. By Essence Substantiality, 
the f2 is a substance, and so on ad infinitum.23 
The Second Man's Vice 
Aristotle takes this result to establish the conclusion that "Clearly, then, 
each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence" 
(1032a4-6). But the question arises, why should this conclusion follow? 
What exactly is the offending element in the Second Man Argument (SMA) 
that forces this conclusion upon us? It might be thought that Aristotle takes 
the regress argument to require the actuality of the infinite - e.g. for Hoofty 
to be a horse, there should be an infinity of substances, one being the 
essence of the other. If so, it might be thought that Aristotle objects to this 
result because he does not believe there are actual infinities. But I do not 
think this is the difficulty at hand. After all, Aristotle did not object to every 
human having a human parent, which generates a benign infinite regress. 
Independently of Aristotle's reasons for rejecting the conclusion of the 
argument, it is of intrinsic philosophical interest whether the regress of the 
SMA is a benign or a vicious one, and what conclusions one might draw 
from it, especially if one is not opposed to the actuality of the infinite. I 
23 It is of course understood that Aristotle is assuming that if f, is the essence off, then f is 
not the essence of f, (where f, # f). The reason is that it would be metaphysically 
nonsensical for an essence to belong (as an essence) to what belonged to it (as an 
essence)! In general, no items in the series reappear further along the series. The 
question of metaphysical interest for Aristotle is whether an item recurred consecutively 
in the series, but this is here denied by the Non-Identity premise. 
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believe that the infinite regress in the SMA is not benign but vicious; I shall 
argue, in what follows, that the premises of the SMA are inconsistent; 
further, that Aristotle saw them as such, for which reason he takes the SMA 
to be a reductio proof that the non-identity claim between a substance and 
its essence is false. 
An indication that Aristotle must have associated the result of the SMA 
with an impossibility can be found in the arguments that he offers earlier on 
in Z, 6 against the substance-essence separation. There are five arguments, 
not all of which have the same philosophical generality. Aristotle uses as 
examples of substance the Platonic Forms and assumes that they are differ- 
ent from their essences, which are, themselves, substances. The first three 
arguments are given in the following: 
If the essence of good is different from the Idea of good, and the essence of animal 
from the Idea of animal, and the essence of being from the Idea of being, there will, 
firstly, be other substances and entities and Ideas besides those which are asserted. 
and secondly, these others will be prior substances if the essence is substance. And 
if the posterior substances are severed from the prior,24 there will be no knowledge 
of the ones and the others will have no being. (1031a31-b4) 
I shall not dwell on these arguments because they are too narrowly confined 
to either the Theory of Forms or Aristotle's epistemology. The first argu- 
ment concerns the proliferation of substances that results (even within the 
world of Ideas) from the distinction of substance and essence. The second 
argument points out that the assumption that a substance has no further 
substances and principles prior to it is undermined by the distinction of 
substance and essence. The third argument is that if the substances are 
different from their essences, then the substances will not be knowable. 
This latter claim rests on the Aristotelian position that "there is knowledge 
of each thing only when we know its essence" (1031b6-7), so that if a 
substance is different from its essence, and it is knowable in terms of its 
essence, the substance will not be knowable. This, of course, is knowledge 
in the strict, Aristotelian scientific sense. 
The fourth argument is again one that is sound only as an argument 
against the Platonic Forms. It could not hold its ground either within the 
Aristotelian metaphysics, or in the broader philosophical spectrum. Aris- 
totle has explained that "by 'severed' I mean, if the Idea of good has not the 
24 Ross/Barnes misleadingly translate " MokEkutlvaL 6XkkkXwv" as: "And if the post- 
erior substances are severed from one another", in Barnes (1985) p. 1628. The assump- 
tion of this argument is not that Platonic Forms are severed from one another, but that 
they are severed from their essences, as becomes evident both from what precedes and 
follows this line in the text. 
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essence of good, and the latter has not the property of being good" 
(1031b4-6). On this basis, Aristotle says that "if the essence of the good is 
not good, neither will the essence of being be" (1031b8-9). And since the 
case is the same for all Forms, if the essence of one Form does not exist 
(namely, of the Form of Being), nor do the essences of the rest of the 
Forms: "all the essences alike exist or none of them does; so that if the 
essence of being is not, neither will any of the others be" (1031b9-10). But 
even if all other assumptions were agreed to, still the argument rests on 
there being a Form of Being, which Aristotle was first to deny. Hence this 
argument will have no force in the Aristotelian system, or any subsequent 
system in which existence is not a property. 
The final argument is the most interesting one. This argument rests on 
the explanation that Aristotle provides of the separateness of a substance 
from its essence: "the Idea of the good has not the essence of good, and the 
latter [the essence of good] has not the property of being good" (1031b5-6). 
Aristotle has already derived two consequences from this: that substances 
will not be knowable, and that essences will not exist. He now wants to show 
the metaphysical consequence that follows about substances. He says: 
"Again, that which has not the essence of being good is not good" 
(1031bI 1).25 Namely, not only will the Idea of the good not be knowable, 
but, without the essence of good, i.e. without being "what it is to be good", 
the Idea of good will not be good.26 But "good" is just what the Idea of good 
is. If the paradigmatically good is not good, the theory confronts a contra- 
diction. 
25 The Greek sentence here is "ItL W v P']TQ9XEL aya0W ELV0L, OVsx Ayaot6v". W.D. 
Ross' translation "Again, that which has not the property of being good is not good" (my 
emphasis) is misleading, since it might be read as stating that it is the essence of the good 
which is deprived of the property of being good. This, in fact, is Alexander's reading of 
the passage, who takes the argument to be that that which is different from the Idea of the 
good is not good, and hence, since the essence of the good is different from the Idea of the 
good, the essence of the good is not good. (Alexander, op. cit., 483.7-12). But this would 
not be objectionable for the reason that there is no prior understanding that the essence 
of good is good; only that the Idea of the good is good. Alexander says that "'' b keYEL, 
TOtOfIOT6v EOTLV ("Whatever it is called, such it is", 483.9). But it is the Idea of the 
good, not the essence of the good, that is said to be the good. Furthermore, it would be 
strange if Aristotle proved first that the essence of the good does not exist (1031b9-10) 
and then immediately proceeded to prove that the essence of the good is not 
good. Ross' position becomes clear in his commentary, where it is evident that the 
property in question (in the passage quoted above) is the essence of the good (Ross, op. 
cit., p. 178); so he would disagree with Alexander's reading. 
26As Asclepius explains: "ov'x 6o'uv yaO6v j3 TM 0 )JTaQXeL syawO dvCtL- (393.17- 
18) -whatever does not possess "being good" is not good. 
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That the metaphysical separateness of a substance from its essence leads 
to contradiction should signal a warning sign regarding the premises of the 
SMA. What is common between this version of the Theory of Forms and 
the premises of the SMA is that in both, a substance is different from its 
essence. Although this would not disallow a substance to be somehow 
related to its essence, I will argue that their difference alone is sufficient to 
lead to an impossibility, and hence, that the SMA regress is vicious. I will 
further argue that the impossibility is not an epistemic one, as Alan Code 
has argued, and Frank Lewis agreed, but a metaphysical one.7 The key to 
the discovery of the inconsistency is given to us by Aristotle, but not in Z, 6. 
In Z, 4, Aristotle defines essence as follows: "The essence of each thing is 
what it is said to be in virtue of itself'.2'8 This shows the intimacy between x's 
essence and x being an f in virtue of itself. The essence of x is just what x is in 
virtue of itself. Therefore, distinguishing x from its essence is distinguishing 
x from itself. 
Understanding essence in this way, let us turn to the premises of the SMA. 
The definition of substance requires a substance to be anf in virtue of itself. 
Since being anf is the substance's essence, it follows that the substance is its 
essence in virtue of itself. But this is just what is being denied by the 
Non-Identity Premise, which states that a substance is different from what it 
is to be anf, i.e from its essence. It follows that a substance is not its essence 
in virtue of itself. Hence, the premises of the SMA require by the definition 
of substance that a substance be an f in virtue of itself, while the Non- 
Identity premise denies that a substance is an f in virtue of itself. The 
premises are therefore committed to a contradiction: a substance both is, 
and is not, an f in virtue of itself. 
Metaphysical Implications 
The incompatibility in the premises of the SMA is fundamental. The 
problem it points to starts at the first step: if the essence of a substance is 
different from the substance, the substance is not what it is in virtue of itself, 
but is what it is in virtue of something other than itself; it is not a kath' hauto 
entity, but a complex of one thing said of another. Yet substance is the par 
excellence kath' hauto entity, so if it is not what it is in virtue of itself, 
7 Code argues that Aristotle found the series of essences of essences absurd because no 
essence would be definable, since "one cannot go through an infinite series in thought". 
op. cit. p. 121. F. Lewis, op. cit., p. 164. 
- (OtTi TO TL V'V ElVQl EXCOTOV 0 Cy?ETCL XEO' i'UT6", 1029b13-14. 
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nothing is. This would be a world of subjects which are not what they are, a 
world of individuals with borrowed identities. The Second Man regress 
does not reveal a proliferation in the ontology, but a paradox of entities in 
search of their nature. The kath' hauto requirement for substancehood is 
breached in the very first step of the regress, generating an impossible 
division, which cannot be mended in any subsequent step. To avoid it, 
things must not possess, or be related to their natures, but be natures 
themselves. 
Aristotle's greatest contribution to metaphysics was to show that there is 
no internal structure between the subject and its nature, no nexus of 
instantiation separating them, and hence, no ontological division corre- 
sponding to the two logico-semantic roles of subject and essence. Sub- 
stances are neither neutral loci of predication, nor complexes (finite or 
infinite) of one thing said of another, but are directly essences 
(1031b31).29'3 
University of Edinburgh 
29V "ELVL EVLa E?UOU; li ,V MivM." 1 am therefore in disagreement with com- 
mentators who think that Aristotle had the option of avoiding the difficulties of the SMA 
by stopping the regress somewhere along the way, making it a finite series of essences. 
Alexander says: "uL X(Ok' A [LT) EU iV EXCTOV Tov UTOV ELVCL xai TO TI Lv EIVTL 
oErTw, ci&a ?T noXkXa TOjiTO E?lQioXEOaL;" (op. cit., 485,14-16); Halper says: "to 
avoid the infinite regress, something must be identified with its essence. But if this will be 
necessary at some point, why not immediately identify thing and essence . . . ?" (op. cit. 
p. 82); and Loux: "We are told only that, to the extent that we endorse the hypothesis 
that essence is ousia, we should be prepared to hold to the identity of object and essence 
at the appearance of the first essence in the series. But, of course, this is only a counsel of 
parsimony; it is consistent with the argument Aristotle is developing that the identifica- 
tion of object and essence occur at some later stage in the series" (op. cit., pp. 100-101). 
A. Code's interpretation rests on "the claim that a chain of essential predications cannot 
go on indefinitely, but this claim does not by itself contradict the claim that E(horse) 7$ 
E(E(horse))" (op. cit., p. 121), since the identity can occur somewhere along the line of 
essential predications. We saw - note 15 above - that Code supplies an argument for 
Aristotle, to show that, not only must the identity occur somewhere along the line, but it 
occurs at the beginning; that is, the essence of horse is identical to the essence of the 
essence of horse (op. cit., p. 122). But we also saw that there is no justification for Code's 
basic assumption, either on a priori grounds, or on interpretational grounds for attribut- 
ing it to Aristotle. 
I have argued that the separation of a substance from its essence is incompatible with 
the claim that it is substance, namely, that it is what it is in virtue of itself. Hence, no 
substance-essence separation can be tolerated, even for a finite number of ontological 
steps. The reason why Aristotle says that only "EvLa'" (some entities) are directly 
essences is that apart from essences of substances, he wants to allow, in a secondary 
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sense, for essences of non-substances (1030a29-32), which do not determine what the 
subject is in itself. 
"' Asclepius offers an implausible interpretation of this passage. He takes it that what 
Aristotle means when he wonders "why should not some things be essences EUtjOii?" is, 
why shouldn't some things be essences directly, i.e. even if they do not have a name 
("Ti X(WXVAR xai vivv 'VLa ELVaL EUOO T; r T jV ENCEL, TOUTv=TLV Cv(v ovoICa- 
TOg", Op. cit., 395.24-26)! The argument has been introduced by Aristotle by supposing 
that we give a name to each of the essences, but Aristotle did not take this to be 
controversial, nor did he assign any ontological significance to it. In fact, nothing in the 
argument depends on there being a name for the essence, as Asclepius proceeds to 
explain (395.26-29). It is therefore implausible that Aristotle is referring to essences 
without names when he says "why should not some things be essences erOvb?-. 
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